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Josiah Royce Influenced Charles
Peirce
David E. Pfeifer
1 Josiah Royce (born 10 November 1855) was sixteen years younger than Charles Peirce
(born 10 September 1839). Most often, senior scholars influence younger scholars. This
view seems common. On the surface, reading histories and biographies, it appears that
while Peirce influenced Royce, Royce did not have any impact on Peirce. For example, the
superb history of American Philosophy by Elizabeth Flower and Murray Murphey (1977)
has no mention of Royce in the Peirce chapter, but has numerous Peirce references in the
Royce chapter. Even the meticulous Max Fisch wrote: “Royce was […] acquainted with
Peirce, followed his work with increasing interest, and was increasingly influenced by it”
(Fisch 1951: 3). The standard biographies of Royce1 and Peirce2 do not indicate Royce had
an influence on Peirce. A strong example of this view is expressed by Frank Oppenheim,
the dean of Royce scholars, who wrote:
Royce experienced  Charles  Peirce’s  Cambridge  Conferences  of  1898  as  epoch-
making,  since  “they  started  me  on  such  new tracks  [Letter  of  21  June  1901  to
William  James].”  [Royce  integrated]  Peirce’s  ideas  of  continuity,  individuality,
infinity,  system, and the logic of relatives into his own idea of individuality […]
After a stroke in early February 1912, a recuperating Royce, temporarily relieved
from  teaching,  carefully  compared  and  contrasted  the  early,  middle,  and  late
published writings of “our American logician,” Charles Peirce. In this way Royce
grasped Peirce’s theories of signs, interpretation, and his three categories far more
profoundly than previously. (Oppenheim 2004,118-9)
2 Even Douglas Anderson in his masterful article, “Who’s a Pragmatist: Royce and Peirce at
the Turn of the Century,” says, “I take as given […] the fact that Peirce influenced Royce’s
thought in some important ways,” (2005: 473) without discussing how Royce may have
influenced  Peirce.  Mary  Mahowald  in  her  insightful  study  of  Royce’s  Idealistic
Pragmatism states:
That Charles Peirce and William James, both well known pragmatists, exerted an
important influence on the philosophy of Royce is evident from the biographical
data, from cross references in their works, and from their correspondence, both
published and unpublished. In general the relationship of Royce to Peirce may be
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characterized as one of deference, his relationship to James as one of friendship.
(Mahowald 1972: 17)3
3 Several recent works have explored the relation between Royce and Peirce. Examples are
books and articles by Ludwig Nagl (2004), Frank Oppenheim (2005), Randall Auxier (2013),
and Cheryl Misak (2013).4 However, none of these authors makes a definite claim that
Royce  influenced  Peirce.  Auxier  (2013:  13)  states  that  “the  direction  of  influence  is
undecidable in many cases.”
4 I would like to tell a tale of Josiah Royce influencing Charles Peirce, a narrative worthy of
presentation, since Royce had a stronger influence on Peirce than many might realize.
The first section of this paper is history, a chronology;5 the second section is a summary
of how Peirce’s thought changed because of this instance of Royce’s influence.6
 
Chronology 
5 Josiah Royce and Charles Peirce knew of each other through Johns Hopkins University,
though not directly. Royce was at Johns Hopkins 1876-1878, receiving his Ph.D. in 1878.
Peirce taught at the university 1879-1884. They knew of each other’s writings, and of
course  were  associated  through  William  James.  Here  are  some  examples  of  their
meetings, at least through writings. Frank Oppenheim points out that at the 20 May 1880
meeting of the Johns Hopkins University Metaphysical Club, Peirce was elected President
and the club heard Royce’s paper entitled “On Purpose in Thought” (Oppenheim 2005:
14).7 In 1885, Peirce seriously studied Royce’s The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, writing a
review8 for the Popular Science Monthly that was never published. While greatly praising
Royce, Peirce chided him for being too Hegelian. In 1899, a change in Peirce’s thought
about Royce came when Peirce read and reviewed Royce’s The World and the Individual:
First Series (1899) and then The World and the Individual: Second Series (1901).9 Peirce offered
high praise for the second volume when he stated: “I will say hic et nunc that the volume
has cut off a big piece of the road that it remains for Philosophy to travel before she will
join company with the rest of the peaceable sciences.”10 He added, “Royce’s ‘The World
and the Individual’ will stand a prominent milestone upon the highway of philosophy.”11
And in a letter to William James he said, “The ideas are very beautiful.”12 Following these
reviews, Peirce actively worked his way through Royce’s recent writings.
6 As might be expected, Peirce often found fault with Royce’s logic. In a 1902 letter to Royce
he stated:  “Underneath your logic  which I  cannot  approve there is  a  nearly  parallel
stream of thought perfectly sound.”13 This comment is repeated in a 1909 manuscript: “
The World and the Individual, [is] a work not free from faults of logic, yet valid in the main.”
14 
7 1902 is  important.  Peirce and Royce corresponded.15 The letters  and an invitation to
Royce to spend time at the Peirce home in Milford in “cooperative” study16 indicate how
seriously Peirce took Royce’s ideas.
8 In the Lowell Lectures of 1903 (Lecture III, draft 3) Peirce named an author who assisted
him in the effort to show the mistake of nominalism, which is the effort “to resolve
everything in our thoughts into those two elements [of Firstness and Secondness alone]”
(CP 1.343 (G-1903-2a)). That author was Josiah Royce, who “in his great work The World
and the Individual has done much to breakup this mistake” (CP 1.343 (G-1903-2a)).
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9 In  1905,  Peirce  even  states  that  “Mr.  Royce  […]  impresses  me  quite  decidedly  as  a
pragmatist” (EP II:361 (Ms. 908 [1905])).
10 In the 1906 “Issues of Pragmatism,” Peirce acknowledged the aid received from Royce’s
World and Individual (CP 5.402n3 (G-1905-1b [1906])). Peirce repeated his praise again in
1909. He admired the concept of “the Reality, [sic] of the Absolute, nearly as it has been
set forth […] by Royce in his The World and the Individual, a work […] valid in the main” (CP
5.358n1 (G-1909-1)).
11 This very brief chronology demonstrates that Peirce thought seriously about what Royce
wrote. Peirce appears to have taken into his own thought elements from those writings.
 
Royce’s Influence
12 A common manner of organizing Peirce’s work is around the concept of realism.17 Peirce
stated that the question of realism is “whether laws and general types are figments of the
mind or are real” (CP 1.16 (G-c.1897-1)). The questions of realism are connected with the
logic of relatives, pragmatism, evolution, objective idealism, continuity, and semiotics –
sometimes one feels that everything in Peirce’s thought is interconnected, as he said
himself: “a very snarl of twine” (CP 6.184 (G-c.1911-1)). This discussion will focus on aims,
purposes and continuity. 
13 The earliest mention of an aim or purpose by Peirce I can find is:
The agapastic development of thought should, if it exists, be distinguished by its
purposive character,  this  purpose being the development of an idea.  We should
have a direct agapic or sympathetic comprehension and recognition of it by virtue
of  the  continuity  of  thought.  I  here  take  it  for  granted that such continuity  of
thought has been sufficiently proved by the arguments used in my paper on the
“Law of Mind” in The Monist of last July. (CP 6.315 (G-18911e [1893])) 
14 While one immediately sees parallels to Royce’s thought, one can also see that this notion
of purpose could have grown from Peirce’s development of his realism and his thought on
evolution and continuity. Obviously, the concept of purpose is not unique to Royce or
Peirce.
15 Max Fisch chronicled Peirce’s realist development in his essay “Peirce’s Progress from
Nominalism toward Realism” (Fisch 1986:  184-200).  As  part  of  this  chronology,  Fisch
(1986: 189) mentioned the 1885 “provocative” book by Josiah Royce, The Religious Aspect of
Philosophy. Peirce’s review of this work is a place to begin our discussion. A quick read of
the review demonstrates easily that Peirce took seriously what Royce wrote. Peirce was
working  his  way  through Royce’s  thinking,  although he  rejected  much of  what  was
presented. The review’s discussion of Royce’s thoughts on an aim or ultimate end – we
might say purpose – is something that reappears in Peirce’s writings.
16 If the term ‘purpose’18 is used as a lens through which to consider the term ‘application’
in the following quotation, we see how in April, 1900, Peirce was refining his pragmatic
maxim.
[i]n  my  youth  I  wrote  some  articles  to  uphold  a  doctrine  I  called  Pragmatism,
namely, that the meaning and essence of every conception lies in the application
that is to be made of it. That is all very well, when properly understood. I do not
intend to recant it. But the question arises, what is the ultimate application. (Peirce
1966: 332)
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17 A discussion of ultimate application seems very Roycean. Peirce began to understand that
actions require some end or purpose. At this time, Peirce revised the pragmatic maxim to
include the notion of purpose, a central element in Royce’s thought. 
18 A place to begin a more specific discussion of how Peirce’s thinking changed is the April,
1900, Nation review of The World and the Individual: First Series. It opened with Peirce stating
that the purpose of the volume “is to say what it is that we aim at when we make any
inquiry or investigation – not what our ulterior purpose may be, nor yet what our special
effort is in any particular case, but what the direct and common aim of all search for
knowledge is” (CP 8.100 (N-1900-15)). Peirce saw that “Prof. Royce reaches his conclusion
by analyzing the nature of the purpose of an idea” (CP 8.105 (N-1900-15)).
19 And in a draft of the review, Peirce stated,
[…] in the same pragmatistic spirit, Prof. Royce holds that the Internal Meaning of
an idea is a Purpose, obscurely recognized in consciousness, partially fulfilled in
being recognized but mainly unfulfilled and ill-understood in itself. The external
meaning lies in the fulfillment of the purpose. (CP 8.119 [G-c.1902-4] a draft of The
World and the Individual review)19
20 In a letter to Christine Ladd-Franklin (most likely from late 1903), Peirce stated:
Royce’s opinions as developed in his ‘World and Individual’ are extremely near to
mine.  His  insistence  on  the  element  of  purpose  in  intellectual  concepts  is
essentially the pragmatistic position. (Ladd-Franklin 1916: 720)20
21 After the review of The World and the Individual, while continuing his correspondence with
Royce, Peirce writes more extensively on purpose. Purpose as a concept become more
prominent.  In  the  1902  entry  on  Pragmatism  in  James  Mark  Baldwin’s  Dictionary  of
Philosophy and Psychology,21 Peirce wrote about the same kind of transition in his thinking,
this time using the term ‘end.’
If it be admitted […] that action wants an end, and that that end must be something
of a general description, then the spirit of the maxim itself, which is that that we
must look to the upshot of our concepts in order rightly to apprehend them, would
direct us towards something different from practical facts, namely, to general ideas,
as the true interpreters of our thought. (Peirce 1972: 301)
22 The upshot is that Peirce began to see a connection between general concepts and ends,
or  Royce  might  say  –  purposes.  Peirce  incorporated  into  the  pragmatic  maxim  the
concept of purpose that is evident in Royce’s writings.
23 Peirce’s reading of Royce led him to articulate a fourth grade of clearness22 which comes
when a concept, a conceived action, is thought of in terms of its purpose. The importance
of purpose can be seen in Peirce’s 190223 application to the Carnegie Institution seeking
funding for thirty-six memoirs, wherein he states “[…] my paper of 1878 was imperfect in
tacitly  leaving  it  to  appear  that  the  maxim  of  pragmatism  led  to  the  last  stage  of
clearness,” and “I shall develop a fourth, and higher, grade of clearness, resulting from an
appreciation of the intellectual relations of the definitum [the thing defined].”24 Further,
Peirce agrees with Schiller (CP 5.494 (G-c.1907-1c)) and Royce (CP 8.115 (G-c.1900-2))25
that meaning requires a purpose. Peirce recognized that “concepts are purposive” (CP
8.322 (Letter to F. C. S. Schiller,  10 September 1906)) and that “The elements of every
concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the
gate of purposive action, and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates
is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason” (CP 5.212 (G-1903-1)). Vincent Colapietro
(1986)26 connects  a  fourth grade of  clearness,  namely purpose,  to  semiosis,  a  central
Josiah Royce Influenced Charles Peirce
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-2 | 2016
4
element in Peirce’s semiotic, sign theory. Peirce stated that the Pragmatic Maxim is “a
far-reaching theorem solidly grounded upon an elaborate study of the nature of signs”
(CP 8.191  (G-c.1904-3)).  Peirce  in  this  work  is  bringing  together  a  revised  Pragmatic
Maxim, a fourth grade of clearness, purpose, and semiosis. This set of refinements is quite
major.  Royce  may  not  have  been  the  chief  instigator  of  these  changes,  but  Royce’s
writings provided Peirce with the stimulus and occasion for these changes. These changes
could have come later without Royce.
24 In 1906, Peirce mentioned Royce’s influence: 
No doubt, Pragmaticism makes thought ultimately apply to action exclusively – to
conceived  action.  But  between  admitting  that  and  either  saying  that  it  makes
thought, in the sense of the purport of symbols, to consist in acts, or saying that the
true ultimate purpose of thinking is action, there is much the same difference as
there is  between saying that the artist-painter’s  living art is  applied to dabbing
paint upon canvas, and saying that that art-life consists in dabbing paint, or that its
ultimate aim is dabbing paint. Pragmaticism makes thinking to consist in the living
inferential  metaboly  of  symbols  whose  purport  lies  in  conditional  general
resolutions  to  act.  As  for  the  ultimate  purpose  of  thought,  which  must  be  the
purpose of everything, it is beyond human comprehension; but according to the
stage of approach which my thought has made to it – with aid from many persons,
among whom I  may mention Royce (in his  World and Individual),  Schiller  (in his
Riddles of the Sphinx) as well, by the way, as the famous poet [Friedrich Schiller] (in
his Aesthetische Briefe), Henry James the elder (in his Substance and Shadow and in his
conversations),  together  with  Swedenborg  himself  –  it  is  by  the  indefinite
replication of self-control upon self-control that the vir is begotten, and by action,
through thought, he grows an esthetic ideal, not for the behoof of his own poor
noddle merely,  but as the share which God permits him to have in the work of
creation. (CP 5.402n3 (G-1905-1b [1906]))
25 In this long passage, Peirce reiterated his corrective that the pragmatic maxim does not
lead specifically  to  unique actions  but  to  “conditional  general  resolutions  to  act”  or
conceived action. He once again asserted his realism. The use of the phrase “ultimate
purpose” in this passage is a likely indicator of Royce’s influence on Peirce. Furthermore,
the statement that the ultimate purpose of thought is man’s “share which God permits
him [man] to have in the work of creation” echoes not only Royce but also Peirce own
essay “Evolutionary Love” (CP 6.287-317 (G-1891-1e [1893],  The Monist, January 1893)).
Peirce moved in a Roycean direction.
26 We cannot ignore the aspect of this passage in “Issues of Pragmatism” (above) in which
Peirce stated “it is by the indefinite replication of self-control upon self-control that the
vir is begotten, and by action, through thought, he grows an esthetic ideal.” The vir is
problematic (Krolikowski 1964: 257-70), but some desired end or goal is clearly implied.
This esthetic ideal seems to be Peirce’s summum bonum, the ultimate goal or purpose of all
thought and evolution, the embodiment of reasonableness.  (The first use of the term
summum bonum appears to be in the Minute Logic of 1902 (CP 1.575), shortly after the
Royce review.) The esthetic ideal, the summum bonum, the embodiment of reasonableness
itself and the end or goal of evolution and all thought cannot be conceived except as an
echo of Royce and likely much more. This large set of ideas seems not to have been fully
developed in the remaining years of Peirce’s active career, but it is clear he wished to see
them developed.
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Conclusion
27 Peirce rethought his version of pragmatism, Pragmaticism, as he began to study Royce’s
writings around the time of the publication of The World and Individual. For Peirce, the
1899-1902 time period is full of change in thought resulting from the re-examination of
earlier positions.  Peirce changed his Pragmatic Maxim to move away from actions to
generals, conceived actions or dispositions. He developed his theory of signs, semiotic, to
include purpose.27 These are all major shifts in Peirce’s thought. These shifts brought the
thinking of Peirce and Royce closer than many may have imaged. 
28 The narrative presented here should give us a stronger sense of the interaction between
Royce and Peirce. They appreciated each other’s work. The voluminous correspondence
on logic c.1902-190528 is another indicator that Peirce and Royce understood each other.
We see in this narrative two fine philosophic minds in full dialogue. We gain a further
sense of Peirce’s appreciation for Royce’s thought, and of course, as often stated, Royce’s
appreciation  for  Peirce’s  thought.  Peirce  went  so  far  as  to  state,  “I  think  Royce’s
conception in The World and the Individual (although I do not assent to the logic in that
work) comes nearer to the genuine upshot of pragmaticism than any exposition that a
pragmatist has given, – than any other pragmatist has given” (Ms. 284, p. 6 (c. September
1905)). We must begin to see Royce and Peirce as two workers in the same large field.
James and Dewey are in this field, but Royce and Peirce were closer than the others.
29 The change in Peirce thought in c.1905 was sufficiently great that he went so far as to
state:
If  this analysis of the pragmatistic opinion is correct,  the logical breadth of the
term pragmatist is hereby enormously enlarged. For it will become predicable not
only of Mr. Royce but also of a large section of the logical world, – perhaps the
majority, – since ancient times.29 (EP 2.361 (Ms. 908, late 1905-early 1906))
30 Royce concluded that he could see himself as a pragmatist; he claimed to have developed
“a sort of absolute pragmatism” (Royce 1968: 279). My conclusion is that Peirce was able
to include Josiah Royce in the great company of pragmatists because, with the study of
Josiah Royce’s work, Peirce enlarged his notion of pragmatism. Josiah Royce had a very
significant impact on Charles Peirce, which led to a re-evaluation and development of
Peirce’s thinking during the 1899-1902 time period and to a renewed appreciation for
Royce as a pragmatist.
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NOTES
1. Clendenning 1999; Hine 1992; Kuklick 1985.
2. Brent 1998.
3. I became aware of this passage through the Douglas Anderson article cited above.
4. Note that Misak mistakenly says that Royce “was taught by Peirce” (p. 81) at Johns Hopkins
University. Royce was at Johns Hopkins 1876-1878, receiving his Ph.D. in 1878. In August, 1878,
Royce was in California.  Peirce taught at Johns Hopkins 1879-1884.  Nagl,  in footnote 2 of his
essay, indicates that Peirce became “interested” in Royce’s thought. I wish to take a stronger
stand.
5. In 1891, Peirce and Royce disagreed violently in the Francis Ellington Abbot controversy over
Abbot’s book, Scientific Theism, The Way Out of Agnosticism. The incident does not show the best
side of any of the participants. I will ignore this incident, since it adds nothing to the present
discussion.
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6. The focus of this paper is quite narrow. A separate and much longer paper could easily be done
on how Royce may have influenced Peirce’s pragmatism.
7. Royce was not in attendance. One desires to know what Peirce thought of Royce’s paper.
8. Ms. 1369, published in CP 8.39-54 (in part), W 5:221-4, and EP I: 229-41. Manuscripts are cited
by  the  Richard  Robbin’s  catalogue  number;  CP  refers  to  The  Collected  Papers by  volume and
paragraph number; W refers to the Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition by volume
and page number; and EP refers to the Essential Peirce by volume and page number. See works
cited for complete bibliographic information.
9. Peirce’s review of the first series is published at CP 8.100-16 (N-1900-15; G-c.1900-2), which is a
compilation of the review and associated manuscripts. Peirce’s review of the second series is
published at CP 8.117 (in part) [except 117n10 and 117n12, 8.120 (in part)] and CP 8.126-30 which
are from the published review (N-1902-10). See G-c.1902-4 for selections from alternative drafts
printed with the above.
10. CP 8.117n10 (Letter from Peirce to Royce, 27 May 1902, on The World and the Individual: Second
Series).
11. CP 8.117 (N-1902-10, review in The Nation.)
12. CP 8.277 (Letter to William James, 12 June 1902).
13. CP 8.117n12 (Letter to Josiah Royce, 27 May 1902).
14. CP 5.358n1 (G-1909-1).
15. See Clendenning (1970: 426-7, 435-8). See CP 8.117 n10 & n12 (27 May 1902) plus CP 8.122 n19
(28 May 1902).
16. Peirce invited Royce to spend the summer of 1902 in Milford, PA, for “cooperative study of
Logic, on my [Royce’s] part, and of Hegel, on yours [Peirce’s]” (Clendenning 1970: 436 (20 June
1902)).  Royce did not accept.  Another series of  letters took place in 1905 (Clendenning 1970:
488-9, 489-90, and 490-2).
17. An early and useful study of Peirce’s realism is Boler 1963. The volume has several references
to Royce indicating Royce’s awareness of Peirce’s realism. See especially Boler (1963: 38, n.4).
18. Peirce wrote definitions for The Century Dictionary of the English Language (Peirce 1889-1891).
He supplied some material for ‘applicable’ and ‘application’ (Peirce 1889-1891: 274); wrote several
parts  of  ‘end’  (Peirce  1889-1891:  1917);  but  did  not  provide  anything  for  ‘purpose’  (Peirce
1889-1891: 4858). Peirce was quite familiar with the contents of The Century Dictionary; so it is fair
to assume he knew of these definitions. In ‘application’ is found “The act of applying a general
principle;” in ‘end’ Peirce wrote “That for which anything exists or is done; a result designed or
intended; ultimate object or purpose;” and in ‘purpose’ is “Import; meaning; purport; intent.” 
19. Again, Anderson (2005: 473) called this quotation to my attention.
20. Christine  Ladd-Franklin,  (1916),  “Charles  S.  Peirce  at  the  Johns  Hopkins,”  The  Journal  of
Philosophy,  13,  26 (21 December),  720.  The letter is  not dated in the publication,  but internal
evidence indicates that it written after mid-1903.
21. Baldwin wrote Peirce about doing entries for the Dictionary on 9 October 1900.
22. At times Peirce speaks of a fourth grade of clearness; at other times he seems to include
purpose in the third grade of clearness. Peirce’s final decision on a fourth grade of clearness is
not evident. I will speak of the fourth grade simply for ease in exposition of my theme.
23. Note the year: it is the same as the review of The World and the Individual and during the time
when Peirce and Royce were corresponding.
24. Carnegie Foundation Application (L75), reprinted in part in Peirce 1976a, vol. 4: 30.
25. See Ladd-Franklin (1916: 720).
26. Also see Pfeifer 2011.
27. David Pfeifer (2013: 107-16).
28. See the letters in L385 of Peirce manuscripts (Peirce 1976b), and the letters from Royce in
Clendenning 1970.
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29. Note should also be made that Peirce praises Royce’s work in logic. Witness Ms. 816A, p. 1, a
discussion of Royce 1905. Context and correspondence place discussion as late 1905 or possibly
early 1906. Peirce states: “Prof. Royce has shown discernment in devoting so much as he has to
the  study  of  these  [A.  B.  Kempe’s]  conceptions,  and  his  memoir  is  unquestionably  of  very
considerable value.”
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